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Estimating Government Policy Preferences to Predict New Firm Formation 
Introduction 
  Knowledge about the role entrepreneurship plays in economic development has 
evolved over the last several decades and many believe that increasing the level of 
entrepreneurship also increases the odds of long-term economic prosperity. Recently, 
emphasis has been placed on the effect community culture has on entrepreneurship, 
specifically on the formation and survival of new firms (Armington and Acs 2002; Goetz 
and Freshwater 2001; Florida 2002; Fritsch and Mueller, 2007; Lee, Florida and Acs 2004). 
Conceptually, community culture is believed to be related to the entrepreneurial climate. 
Within the literature, the term entrepreneurial climate (also referred to as entrepreneurial 
culture) has been used somewhat ambiguously, but has been used to describe how 
supportive communities are with respect to the creation and survival of new businesses 
(Armington and Acs 2002; Goetz and Freshwater 2001; Fritsch and Mueller, 2007). 
Community support can take a wide variety of forms, for example, the availability of capital 
for business loans, the presence of other new firms or the amount of government spending 
on education. The general idea is that communities with strong entrepreneurial climates 
should experience more new business formation relative to communities with weaker 
entrepreneurial climates. The challenge for policy makers lies in knowing how to 
encourage communities’ entrepreneurial climate when the concept itself is not well 
defined. Several studies have identified potential indicators of strong entrepreneurial 
climates, for example, the number of self-proprietors (Armington and Acs 2002), the 
number of artisans (Lee, Florida and Acs 2004), and the number of young, small firms 
(Fritsch and Mueller 2007). However, making specific governmental policy 3 
 
recommendations based on these indicators pose some challenges for researchers. The 
extent that governments can influence the formation and survival of new firms remains 
unclear (Peak and Marshall 2007). Further, community culture encompasses more than a 
few measures and is not captured very well in previous models.  
  In this study, an approach to modeling new firm formation is proposed which differs 
from previous research in two ways. First, this study expands determinants used in some 
other studies to include both fiscal and spending policies of states. Second, the approach 
allows states’ fiscal and spending policies to be determined by the states’ culture, which are 
reflected by a wide range of demographic information. In this way, states’ entrepreneurial 
climates do not have to be directly defined in the context of states’ culture but are 
embodied in state governments’ decision making. The proposed procedure employs the 
methods developed by Aaberge and Langorgen (2003) to distinguish between subsistence 
policies (i.e., policies which reflect mandated programs and regulatory oversight) and 
discretionary polices (preferences beyond subsistence) and further limits state 
governments’ influence to discretionary policies only.  
Literature Review 
Entrepreneurship and Community Culture 
  Goetz and Freshwater (2001) distinguish between two types of new business 
formation: that which results from the production of new products or services 
(Schumpeter’s concept of entrepreneurship) and that which results from normal 
population and income growth (subsistence growth not resulting from entrepreneurship). 
They focused on Schumpeterian business formation and defined states’ entrepreneurial 
climate as the residuals from the linear regression of new firm formation and initial public 4 
 
offerings on research grants, patents, college graduates, and venture capital. They found 
that increasing human capital in a number of states could potentially lead to more 
entrepreneurship. Additionally, they found that gains from financial capital only occur in 
the early stages of firm formation.      
  Armington and Acs (2002) emphasized the difficulty of quantifying the relationship 
between communities’ culture and the formation of new firms. They explained this 
difficulty is due in part to the lack of a coherent definition of the entrepreneurial climate 
(they use the term entrepreneurial culture) and the disparity over interpreting the causes 
of high regional variation for entrepreneurship. Following the work of Illeris (1986), who 
believes employment choice is directed by the social and cultural factors of one’s 
environment, they used the proportion of self-proprietors as a measure of the 
entrepreneurial climate. They found the number of self-proprietors to be positively related 
to new business formation in certain industries. However, a clear relationship between 
self-proprietors (entrepreneurial climate) and new instances of entrepreneurship given a 
community’s culture was not determined; specifically, the aspects of the culture which may 
have encouraged individuals to start businesses were not identified.  
  Florida (2002) developed the Creative Class Index intended to establish a clearer 
link between a community’s entrepreneurial climate and the amount of entrepreneurship. 
His index is a weighted average of four other measures: the number of artists present, 
Milken Institute's Tech Pole Index (a measure of high technology firms), patents per capita 
and the Gay Index (a measure of male same-sex unmarried partners). He reported that 
communities with a higher tolerance for diversity attracted more high-tech firms. Lee, 
Florida and Acs (2004) expanded this work by examining the impacts of variations in 5 
 
creativity and diversity on the amount of entrepreneurship in the region. In this study, 
creativity was defined by the Bohemian Index (a measure of artisans and other creative 
people in a region), while diversity was measured by the Melting Pot Index (a measure of 
the foreign born population) and the Gay Index. Firm births were used to measure the 
amount of entrepreneurship. They argued that the factors that contribute to creativity and 
diversity in a region also promote innovation and, therefore, encourage entrepreneurship. 
In essence, more creative cultures result in higher levels of entrepreneurship. They 
reported that their creative index was the only significant determinant in all the industry 
sectors analyzed and the diversity index was only significant in service sectors. Fritsch and 
Mueller (2007) defined the entrepreneurial climate as the concentration of small and 
young firms and found that employees of small and young firms are more likely to start 
their own business than employees of larger firms.  From their analysis, they argued that 
the presence of small and young firms encourages the formation of additional small and 
young firms.  
  Sutaria and Hicks (2004) combined indirect community culture characteristics 
(reflected in local government spending at the municipality level) with a number of 
economic indicators (for example, unemployment, population change, per capita income 
and bank deposits per capita) in an effort to explain the formation of new firms. They 
reported that aggregated local government spending was not a significant factor for 
determining new firm formation. Conversely, Peak and Marshall (2007) investigated the 
impact of state government expenditures (specifically in education, health, highways, 
police protection, natural resources and parks and recreation) on the number of new firm 
formed. Their hypothesis was that state governments can positively impact firm formation 6 
 
through expenditures in a number of broad categories. In general, they found that 
expenditures have a positive effect on new firm formation; however, expenditures on 
police protection were found to have a negative effect. Other studies have pointed to the 
influence of government actions on entrepreneurship (usually measured as new firm 
formation) but did not attempt to quantify the relationship (Birley1986; Bradshaw and 
Blakely 1999; Isserman 1994). 
State Fiscal and Spending Preferences  
  In order to determine state government preferences for fiscal and spending policies, 
a distinction must be made between the minimum subsistence levels of spending and 
savings as well as maximum acceptable levels of taxation. Lluch (1973) developed the 
Extended Linear Expenditure System (ELES), assuming intertemporal choice and 
maximizing a Stone-Geary utility function. The ELES was modified from Stone’s Linear 
Expenditure system to allow for consumer savings in response to price changes. The 
intertemporal choice results as consumers place values on goods at different points in time. 
The Stone-Geary utility function includes a parameter for subsistence which is estimated 
by the ELES. Howe (1975) modified the ELES by making savings a good and assuming 
consumers had preferences for different levels of savings. Further, the subsistence level of 
savings was assumed to be zero.  
  A number of studies have used the ELES approach to model government decision 
making (Inman 1971; Ehrenberg; Johnson 1979; Aaberge and Langørgen 2003; Allers and 
Elhorst 2010). In particular, Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) followed Howe (1975) by 
allowing preferences for savings; however, Aaberge and Langørgen assumed savings could 
be negative in some years resulting in a budget deficit.  Additionally, they made a 7 
 
distinction regarding the control governments could exercise over taxes and user fees by 
making some taxes exogenous while other taxes and user fees were treated as endogenous. 
In essence, governments were assumed to have preferences for part of the income received 
(that from endogenous tax levels and user fees).  
  Another characteristic of the approach used by Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) is 
that elected governments are a reflection of the entire community as opposed to the 
median voter. They included a number of different demographic variables in the individual 
demand equations for public services, taxation and savings. The demographic variables 
selected were believed to be the primary drivers of demand for the public services, taxation 
and savings. Further, demographic variables used varied between demand equations that 
made up the total system. For example, the proportion of families with children age 7 to 15 
was included in the demand equation for education but not in the demand equation for 
infrastructure.  Aaberge and Langørgen argued that estimating the ELES under the 
additional assumptions (taxation and user fee preferences, the potential for negative 
savings, and including demographic variables believed to drive the different demands) 
resulted in subsistence spending on public services, minimum savings (potentially less 
than zero) and maximum levels of taxes would better reflect the preferences of the 
community that elected the government. 
Conceptual Framework 
  The importance of communities’ entrepreneurial climates on levels of 
entrepreneurship has been emphasized in the literature yet the definition remains 
somewhat ambiguous and there is no agreement on its empirical measurement (Armington 
and Acs 2002; Goetz and Freshwater 2001; Florida 2002; Fritsch and Mueller, 2007; Lee, 8 
 
Florida and Acs 2004). Using the methodology developed by Aaberge and Langørgen 
(2003) to estimate fiscal and spending preferences, the challenge of defining and 
measuring states’ entrepreneurial climate is avoided.  Further, because a wide range of 
demographic characteristics are used in the different demand equations, a broader view of 
the entrepreneurial climate is potentially captured. It is also important to consider the 
sequence of events regarding budget decisions and the representative government. 
Therefore, demographic variables should be lagged relative to the fiscal year of the budget 
decision making.    
  Given the previous discussion about state fiscal and spending preferences, it is 
reasonable to consider the extent of government control over expenditures is limited to the 
discretionary policies (preferences) directed at the various services or policies that result 
in a reduction from the maximum acceptable level of taxes and user fees. This implies that 
results from entrepreneurial studies examining government control that do not 
differentiate between the observed quantities of spending, savings and taxes and user fees 
may be misleading. Additionally, the distinction made by Goetz and Freshwater (2001) 
between Schumpeterian and subsistence business formation may justify new 
interpretations of the intercept in a regression of new firms on the fiscal and spending 
preferences. If only the intercept is used, then it would be interpreted as the subsistence 
level of firm growth due to an increase in population and income. However, the intercept 
value will be a single value for all states. Therefore, the interpretation in the context of the 
model used would be an average subsistence among all states. If subsistence levels of 
government spending is also included, then one would expect that the sum of the 9 
 
subsistence levels times their respective coefficients would explain the subsistence level of 
firm growth for each state.   
  Another consideration is the variables to be included in the model. Peak and 
Marshall (2007) regressed new firm formation (firms less than 500 employees) on per 
capita state expenditures on education, health, highways, police protection, natural 
resources and parks and recreation to determine how state governments can influence 
new firm formation (firms less than 500 employees). They justified their selection of 
variables based on spending they believed would strongly affect new firms’ formation. This 
strategy assumes government decision makers have control over all levels of spending. 
However, once the subsistence levels of services are provided (argued here to be beyond 
the normal control of government decision making), only then can one consider the 
motivation behind additional expenditure on a particular service. If government 
representatives are assumed to maximize the welfare of their constituents, then any extra 
spending on a service would be to improve the quality of life or achieve greater economic 
prosperity. In other words, the primary intent of discretionary spending could be thought 
of as increasing the amount of entrepreneurship. Therefore, all the discretionary spending 
(with the exception of savings and administration) as well as a reduction (or increase) in 
taxes and user fees should be included in the regression model. In the models presented in 
the next section, discretionary spending is also lagged one year relative to the new firm 
formation variable. 
    If subsistence spending, minimum acceptable savings and maximum acceptable 
taxes and user fees are not included in the model, the intercept would represent an average 
subsistence level of new firm formation for all states. Since this is a single value for all 10 
 
states, this value should be positive given positive population and income growth in the 
United States. In the expanded model (where subsistence spending, minimum acceptable 
savings and maximum acceptable taxes and user fees are included), the sum of the 
coefficients times their respective values should be positive (negative) where population 
and income growth are positive (negative). If income and population move in different 
directions, then whichever has the strongest affect given its magnitude will determine 
whether or not firms are created or lost. In general, the coefficients on the discretional 
terms are expected to be positive. However, a number of scenarios can be used to explain 
why this may not be the case. For example, an increase in education spending may result in 
a loss of population (and potentially firms) if the unemployment is high as this investment 
may increase competition for jobs and force some to relocate to other states to find work. 
Therefore, results should be considered in the context of unemployment and population 
change. This leads to the necessity to estimate two additional models (one with the 
subsistence, minimum savings and maximum user fees and taxes and one without) that 
include a change in population and change in employment variable. As discussed above, the 
coefficients on these two new variables are expected to be positive.   
Methods and Procedures 
  The first step in the proposed procedure is to estimate spending preferences. The 
second step is to estimate the regression model using new firm formation (endogenous) 
and the estimated preferences (exogenous) and subsistence government spending 
(exogenous). The third step is to test for misspecification, specifically non-normality, static 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  The fourth step is to select a final model and 
discuss the implications of the estimated parameters. 11 
 
Estimating State Preferences 
  Lluch (1973) demonstrated that maximization of a Stone-Geary welfare function 
subject to a budget constraint resulted in the ELES. Howe (1975) showed that the ELES 
could also be obtained with the inclusion of a savings subsistence parameter. Aaberge and 
Langørgen (2003) allowed savings subsistence to be negative (creating a potential budget 
deficit) and added a parameter for maximum acceptable user taxes and user fees. 
Following Aaberge and Langørgen, the resulting system of equations are:  
 
 
where   is the expenditure on service k for state i in year t,   is the subsistence 
spending on service k,   is the exogenous income, mx  is the maximum acceptable  
taxes and user fees (endogenous part of the income),    is minimum acceptable level 
of savings,   is the subsistence spending on service j, for  , and   is 
the share of discretionary income directed to service k. Similar equations are specified for 
savings and taxes: 
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where   and   are the observable savings and taxes respectively and   and   
are the shares of discretionary income directed to savings and reduced from taxes 
respectively. Note that discretionary spending is represented by: 
 
Because prices are not observable, the subsistence spending, minimum acceptable level of 
savings and maximum acceptable level of taxes and users fees have to be estimated using a 
set of demographic variables from each state believed to drive the demand for the 
particular services, savings or taxes and user fees.  Additionally, the shares must also be 
estimated with a different set of explanatory variables that are uncorrelated with the 
demographic variables used in the subsistence, minimum savings and maximum tax and 
user fees equations.  The equations to be estimated for the subsistence spending and shares 
of discretionary income are:  
 
 
 
where   is the demographic variable h to explain service k for state i in year  , 
 is the share explanatory variable g of service k,   and   are the random errors 
and the   and   are parameters to be estimated for   and  .  13 
 
Similarly, equations like (3a) and (4a) are estimated for minimum acceptable savings and 
its respective share, as well as maximum acceptable taxes and user fees and its respective 
share. 
 
 
 
 
where  ,  ,  and   are parameters to be estimated for   and  . The 
values for H and G may differ between equations as some equations may have more (or 
less) explanatory variables and the explanatory variables themselves may also differ 
between equations. Finally, the adding up constraint is imposed such that the shares sum 
to one,  . 
  A new set of explanatory variables are now provided to estimate the following four 
models: 
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where   is the per capita new firm formation (with fewer than 500 employees) for 
state i in year t,   is a vector of the subsistence spending and maximum acceptable 
taxes and user fees in year  ,   is a vector of discretionary spending and a 
reduction in taxes and user fees,  is the change in population,  is the 
change in employment,   is an indicator variable for year,   is the random error term, 
and  ,  and   are parameters to be estimated and   and   are vectors of parameters 
to be estimated. 
Data 
  State expenditures are from the U.S. Census for 2003-2007 (see Table 1).  
Demographic information used to estimate subsistence, minimum savings and maximum 
taxes and user fees and the other explanatory variables used to estimate the shares of 
discretionary income are shown in Table 2. The expenditures are for all 50 U.S. states. The 
tax and user fees were comprised of general sales tax, selected sales tax, license tax and 
other sales tax. The exogenous income was made up of corporate and individual income 
taxes, intergovernmental revenue, miscellaneous general revenue, utility, liquor store and 
insurance trust revenue. Government administration is made up of normal administration 
spending plus interest on general debt, other and non-allocable, utility expenditure, liquor 
store expenditure and insurance trust expenditure. Budget data and per capita income 
were deflated using the consumer price index. New firm formation data were from the U.S. 15 
 
Census for 2004-2007, change in unemployment data is from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis for 2002-2005 and change in population data is from the U.S. Census for 2002-
2005.  For equations 5(a) - 5(d), new firm formation years used are 2004-2007 and the 
estimated fiscal and spending preferences were from years 2003-2006.  
Results 
  The results from estimating the subsistence and shares of discretionary income 
directed at the different services, savings or reduction in taxes and user fees are shown in 
Tables 3 and 4.  The results of the initial misspecification tests conducted on the models 
from equations 5(a) - 5(b) are shown in Table 5. Finally, the parameter estimates of the 
corrected model for equation 5(d) are shown in Table 6. The model presented was only 
corrected for heteroskedasticity; however, the test for normality on the corrected model 
was found to be not significant. Additionally, the autocorrelation in the model was not 
corrected; therefore, the results presented in this section are potentially misleading. 
  The signs for the preferences on education, health, natural resources, parks and 
recreation and on reduced taxes and user fees are positive (for clarification on the 
preferences for taxes and user fees, the value is a reduction in taxes and user fees since the 
preference represents difference between the larger maximum acceptable level and the 
smaller observed level); however only two of these coefficients are significant. The sign on 
highways is of concern especially since the value is significant in the model. These results 
differ considerably from Peak and Marshall (2007), as they reported that only police 
protection had a negative coefficient. Additionally, the subsistence and discretionary 
parameters of like categories (for example, education spending) were tested to see if they 
are the same. Results indicate that a distinction can be made between the effects on firm 16 
 
formation by the subsistence policies versus discretionary policies. The subsistence levels 
of firm formation were calculated from the data and parameter results. As it turns out, the 
preferences were the values negatively affected by a change in population, employment or 
both. Although this result is not intuitive, it may be that the preference is more 
representative of a correction from the subsistence level when the economy is troubled.   
Discussion and Conclusion 
  The purpose of this project was to present an alternative procedure in predicting 
governmental influence on new firm formation without having to directly confront the 
challenges associated with defining and measuring the entrepreneurial climate. The 
estimation of preferences poses two distinct problems in the context of this procedure. The 
variables selected to predict preferences should be carefully considered as small changes in 
these predictor variables lead to dramatic changes in the preferences. This leads to the 
second problem of errors in the estimated preferences and subsistence which would result 
in simultaneity. Therefore, more work is needed to improve this procedure. One suggestion 
for further research includes a Monte Carlo study to examine different properties of the 
resulting estimates.   
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Table 1. State Expenditures 2003-2007 
Variable Namea 
Exogenous Income 
     Intergovernmental revenue 
     Individual income tax 
     Corporate income tax 
     Utility revenue 
     Liquor store revenue 
     Insurance trust revenue 
     Miscellaneous general revenue 
Taxes and User Fees 
     General sales 
     Selective sales 
     License taxes 
     Other taxes 
Education 
Public welfare 
Hospitals 
Health 
Highways 
Police protection 
Correction 
Natural resources 
Parks and recreation 
Government administration 
     Interest on general debt 
     Other and unallocable 
     Utility expenditure 
     Liquor store expenditure 
     Insurance trust expenditure 
a. Retrieved from U.S. Census  
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Table 2. Information to Estimate 
Subsistence and Shares 2002-2006 
Variable Namea 
Subsistence Information 
Population Share 
     0-5 years of age 
     5-17 years of age 
     65-84 years of age 
     80 years & above 
     85 years & above 
Single parents with children 0-6 years 
Mentally disabled 5-15 years per capita 
Mentally disabled 16 years and above per capita 
Unemployed 16-59 years per capita 
Divorced/separated 16-59 per capita 
Foreigners from remote cultures per capita 
Population density 
Person hours (average traveling time) 
Dummy for rural (states) 
Dummy for urbanized cluster (states) 
Dummy for urban (states) 
Duration and severity of cold winter period 
Per capita change in municipal income 
Share Information 
Percent republicans in state house 
Percent republicans in state senate 
Per capita income 
Percent population with H.S. degree 
Percent population with B.S. or higher degree 
a. Retrieved from U.S. Census  
 
 
 
 Table 3. Parameter Estimates for Subsistence, Minimum Savings and Maximum Taxes and User Fees, Equations 3(a) - 3(c) 
Variable Name  Education  Welfare  Hospital  Health  Highway  Police  Corrections  Resources  Parks  Administration  Savings  Taxes 
Subsistence Information                                     
Intercept  -0.087060  -1.776270  0.122845  -0.172160  0.030605  -0.063620  0.064548  0.211020  0.117880  -1.511980  0.605836  1.921332 
 
0.407900  0.463000  0.105600  0.071900  0.127800  0.023200  0.033400  0.044100  0.014500  0.277200  0.093400  0.156000 
Population Share 
                             0-5 years of age 
 
-2.282420 
                   
   
2.473200 
                         5-17 years of age  5.304980 
                     
 
1.474100 
                           65-84 years of age 
 
-0.053820  -0.636540  1.085205 
               
   
1.239000  0.509000  0.330800 
                Single parents with 
children 0-6 years 
 
6.706083  1.831201  0.678689 
               
   
2.272300  1.074500  0.737800 
                Mentally disabled 5-15 
years per capita  -19.407400 
                     
 
9.300000 
                      Mentally disabled 16 
years and above per 
capita 
 
8.269728 
                   
   
1.716500 
                    Unemployed 16-59 
years per capita 
       
3.363434  -0.005500  1.086567  -0.046960 
 
21.618860 
 
-4.650550 
         
1.043700  0.153200  0.241000  0.372800 
 
4.065700 
 
3.174700 
Foreigners from remote 
cultures per capita  -0.733440 
               
-0.641680 
   
 
0.444700 
               
0.576800 
    Population density  -0.000380 
 
0.000021 
 
-0.000006  -0.000001 
   
0.000023  0.000656 
   
 
0.000085 
 
0.000037 
 
0.000034  0.000006 
   
0.000004  0.000116 
    Person hours (average 
traveling time)  0.816352 
 
0.062735  0.374995  -0.179070 
     
0.097363  3.084406 
   
 
0.404700 
 
0.158700  0.106500  0.161500 
     
0.019200  0.659200 
    Dummy for rural 
(states)  0.977194  2.873821  -0.051370  0.011399  0.391205  0.140169  -0.029220  -0.176890  -0.174880 
     
 
0.435200  0.384900  0.055600  0.037500  0.167500  0.031000  0.044800  0.057600  0.019700 
      Dummy for urban 
(states)  0.450169  2.108962 
   
0.068877  0.092499  0.023097  -0.217360  -0.156550 
     
 
0.348000  0.290000 
   
0.139500  0.025100  0.034800  0.044800  0.016600 
      Per capita change in 
municipal income 
   
0.268063 
         
0.027578  2.199634  4.249411  4.099707 
     
0.369100 
         
0.044300  1.321500  1.662900  1.397400 
                          Adjusted R-Squared  0.3714  0.6691  0.0770  0.3071  0.7675  0.4004  0.6310  0.7598  0.4304  0.8328  0.6592  0.2846 
Note: Values in italics are the standard error and are below their respective parameter estimate Table 4.Parameter Estimates for the Shares of Discretionary Income, Equations 4(a)-4(c) 
Variable Name  Education  Welfare  Hospital  Health  Highway  Police  Corrections  Resources  Parks  Administration  Savings  Taxes 
Intercept  0.2218930  0.0569560  0.2125320  -0.1544300  -0.2902100  -0.0145200  -0.0172800  -0.1122400  0.0119690  -0.3314800  0.3310650  1.4017120 
 
0.2931000  0.2059000  0.1008000  0.0734000  0.0962000  0.0179000  0.0274000  0.0383000  0.0110000  0.2393000  0.4075000  0.4663000 
Percent republicans 
in state house  0.3255610  -0.5009500  -0.0823500  -0.0003400  0.2039850  0.0306850  0.0708090  0.0669090  0.0172920  0.0938250  0.2278490  -0.5200500 
 
0.1068000  0.0723000  0.0358000  0.0260000  0.0359000  0.0065500  0.0101000  0.0139000  0.0041300  0.0865000  0.1456000  0.1647000 
Percent republicans 
in state senate  -0.4859000  0.2484190  0.0475400  -0.0281100  -0.0723500  -0.0357700  -0.0597000  -0.0187500  -0.0141300  -0.0739400  0.1079080  0.4545830 
 
0.1062000  0.0706000  0.0348000  0.0254000  0.0348000  0.0064700  0.0099300  0.0136000  0.0040400  0.0846000  0.1461000  0.1655000 
Per capita income  0.0000050  0.0000053  -0.0000012  0.0000017  -0.0000002  0.0000005  0.0000014  0.0000000  0.0000004  0.0000001  -0.0000047  -0.0000074 
 
0.0000020  0.0000014  0.0000007  0.0000005  0.0000007  0.0000001  0.0000002  0.0000003  0.0000001  0.0000017  0.0000025  0.0000028 
Percent population 
with H.S. degree  -0.0020700  0.0008950  -0.0017000  0.0015520  0.0034800  0.0000780  -0.0002700  0.0012910  -0.0003100  0.0081460  -0.0014800  -0.0134600 
   0.0034600  0.0024300  0.0012100  0.0008790  0.0011500  0.0002120  0.0003250  0.0004520  0.0001330  0.0028200  0.0047600  0.0054500 
Note: Values in italics are the standard error and are below their respective parameter estimate Table 5. Misspecification Tests of the Estimated Models 5(a) - 5(d) 
   Heteroskedasticity  Normality  Autocorrelation  Parameter Test
a 
Model Tested  LM  p Value  Bera-Jarque 
p 
Value  DW 
p  
Value 
F 
Value 
p 
Value 
5(a)  34.04  0.0001  11.1115  0.0039  0.6325  0.0001   -   - 
5(b)  36.05  0.0104  8.1429  0.0171  0.8313  0.0001  4.89  0.0001 
5(c)  31.96  0.0007  6.5180  0.0384  0.7909  0.0001   -   - 
5(d)  55.88  0.0002  14.8968  0.0006  1.0157  0.0001  5.28  0.0001 
a. Tests whether the estimates of the subsistence parameters of like expenditure categories are equal to 
the preference parameters of those same categories. 
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Table 6. Heteroskedasticity Corrected MLE of Model for Equation 5(d) 
Variable Name  Estimate  Standard Error  t Value  p Value 
Intercept  2.33800  0.33970  6.88  0.0001 
Subsistence 
        Education  -0.49920  0.15080  -3.31  0.0011 
Public Welfare  -0.46990  0.19310  -2.43  0.0160 
Hospitals  -0.96260  0.60430  -1.59  0.1130 
Health  -2.10040  1.31830  -1.59  0.1129 
Highways  -3.17080  0.88860  -3.57  0.0005 
Police Protection  33.36980  7.21320  4.63  0.0001 
Corrections  2.58900  1.88840  1.37  0.1722 
Natural Resources  9.86900  2.65890  3.71  0.0003 
Parks and Recreation  0.38290  3.85340  0.10  0.9210 
Max Acceptable Tax  0.16190  0.09229  1.75  0.0812 
Preference 
        Education  0.13480  0.09406  1.43  0.1535 
Public Welfare  -0.00515  0.07615  -0.07  0.9462 
Hospitals  -0.46930  0.31540  -1.49  0.1385 
Health  0.55190  0.36130  1.53  0.1285 
Highways  -0.82820  0.20430  -4.05  0.0001 
Police Protection  -0.21480  1.13880  -0.19  0.8506 
Corrections  -1.02320  0.84130  -1.22  0.2255 
Natural Resources  4.01750  0.66940  6.00  0.0001 
Parks and Recreation  1.70370  3.78140  0.45  0.6529 
Tax Increase/Reduction  0.91160  0.10210  8.93  0.0001 
Other Variables 
        Year 1 Indicator  -0.17250  0.07808  -2.21  0.0285 
Year 2 Indicator  -0.20050  0.05645  -3.55  0.0005 
Year 3 Indicator  -0.21890  0.04287  -5.10  0.0001 
Change in Employment  0.12220  0.03003  4.07  0.0001 
Change in Population  0.07533  0.03034  2.48  0.0140 
          Log likelihood  49.20          
 